

## **What was the Role of Ideology in the Creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran?**

The Iranian Revolution was perhaps the most meaningful moment in modern Iranian history. The revolution saw a shift from an autocratic secular monarchy to a theocracy created in the model of a republic. The build-up to the revolution saw many different political groups and ideologies compete and cooperate to counter the power and influence of Muhammad Reza Shah. Due to a British-backed coup, the Pahlavi dynasty had been set up in 1921 under Muhammad's father, Reza Khan Pahlavi (Gasirowski, 1991, 38). The Iranian Revolution was centered in its cities and was marked by popular mass involvement. (Green, 1984, 153). Widespread involvement in the revolution would become a staple throughout the Iranian Revolution. Despite mass involvement, the Iranian Revolution was not dominated by monolithic thinking. There were differing ideologies often associated with socio-economic classes. Despite this, it is worth noting that the Revolution was led, if not dominated, by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini's leadership would give the Religious establishment a significant role in the revolution. Khomeini would appeal to a broad base of the population. Khomeini was able to do this not only through his vast connections in the religious establishment in Qom, but, as Abrahamian noted, Khomeini's popularity was primarily due to his avoidance of making public pronouncements on "doctrinal matters" (Abrahamian, 1991, 17). This avoidance of talking about specific plans Khomeini held for the state he envisioned allowed him to appeal to traditional Islamists, Marxist guerillas, liberal students, and rural to urban migrant workers. The mixing of such a broad coalition led to interesting developments in revolutionary ideology—the incorporation of Marxist and Islamist Marxist parties and guerilla movements allowed for leftist and Marxist ideas. However, after the overthrow of the shah's regime and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini no longer held back his ideas for how a state should be constituted. He now possessed near-total control over the creation of this new state. Nikki Keddie would refer to this initial period of Khomeini's rule, 1979-1983, as being characterized by movement "ever more towards Khomeini's brand of absolutist religious radicalism." (Keddie, 1983, 589) The absolutist religious radicalism referred to by Keddie can be seen in the new institutions the state created in the initial period of the Republic, and especially in the importance and role the constitution placed on the clerical establishment in Iran. The revolution would see the formation of a broad coalition, with nearly the whole spectrum of ideology, however, only one ideology would persist

to dominate the Islamic Republic, and would be present in Iran today. Specifically, Khomeini's own ideology, and that of the religious establishment. In the first part of this essay, we will look at ideological origins within the revolution and the groundwork for the republic. In the second part, we will discuss the creation and establishment of the Islamic Republic. In the third part, we will analyze the effect of a period of radical control from hardliners in the Republic. Finally, we will discuss the Thermidor period factionalism during the 1980s.

The Iranian Revolution was marked by popular mass involvement, and therefore, participation cut through ideological lines. Ervand Abrahamian's paper, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," refers to the Revolution as a largely peaceful movement, characterized by peaceful demonstrations and general strikes, despite the power of a 400,000 man strong army equipped with modern weaponry. (Abrahamian, 1980, 21). Demonstrations were largely peaceful, despite the tendency of the state to brutally and violently suppress dissenting demonstrations, the most pertinent example of which can be seen in the Jaleh Square massacre, also known as 'Black Friday.' Abrahamian argues that mass intervention was integral to Iranian society and "that demonstrations were to Iranians what apple pie is to Americans." (Abrahamian, 2009, 31-32). Abrahamian continues and points out that mass intervention of the populations was not new to Iranian history, citing the mass protests that led to Mossadeq being reinstated as Prime Minister after his removal by the shah in 1952 (Abrahamian, 2009, 31). This history of mass involvement from the broader population is vital to the revolution, as it formed the backbone of the movement's power.

Furthermore, Abrahamian notes one of George Rude's conclusions, that revolutionary crowds are not necessarily groups bent on anarchy but capable of acting rationally (Abrahamian, 2009, 13). Rude analyzes the French Revolution and concludes that those participating in the revolutionary demonstrations were not driven by radical fervor or a desire for anarchy but by rational decision-making based on their needs. He places the primary and most constant motive for their participation as "the concern for the provision of cheap and plentiful food." (Rudé, 1981, 208). This is important to the Iranian Revolution for two reasons. First, it justifies the idea that the crowds in the revolution were not a disorganized rabble but were part of a larger political organization that formed the opposition to the shah's regime. Secondly, it causes

us to ask further what reasons those who formed the crowds participated in the first place and that there must be clear and rational reasons as to why.

The revolution was composed of different socio-economic groups with varying interests and reasons as to why they participated. In “The Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution,” Abrahamian notes the three biggest bases of opposition to the Pahlavi regime: the urban working class, the traditional bazaar class, and the religious establishment. These three groups would form the crux of the Revolution’s support base. The urban working class would be heavily involved in demonstrations, providing a bulk of the manpower for the mass protests (Abrahamian, 1980, 24-25). These three groups would hold different motivations for participating in the revolution, identify with different ideological groups, and seek different goals for the revolution. However, these groups were not equal in power. The clergy was, among the three groups, the most powerful and influential. Ali Ghessari and Vali Nasr argue that the clergy was the only group to adequately utilize ideology to amass support, which provided it with ample power, particularly in its ability to mobilize and coalition-build, therefore providing the clergy with most of the power (Ghessari & Nasr, 2006, 21). The religious establishment has had a history of competition and disagreement with the Pahlavi regime. Clerical opposition to the regime began with the shah social and economic reforms known as the White Revolution. The White Revolution was an attempt by the shah to reorganize the Iranian society and economy. Abbas Amanat notes in his book, *Iran: A Modern History*, that Khomeini was already organizing opposition to the shah in coordination with the bazaar classes, who would join his opposition to the shah again in the 1979 revolution (Amanat, 2017, 588). According to Amanat, Khomeini’s opposition to the shah’s policies of the White Revolution, particularly the shah’s attempts at land reform, began in 1959 (Amanat, 2017, 594). Khomeini’s opposition to the shah would prove representative of the feelings of the wider religious establishment. In addition to the opposition to land reform, Abrahamian notes that the clerical establishment found another source for the opposition, which he deemed the “moral problem” (Abrahamian, 1980, 25). The “moral issue” was related to the extensive rural-to-urban migration resulting from the shah’s land reform policies, which caused large numbers of these migrants to live in shantytowns. Abrahamian notes that these migrants led to terrible conditions and “deprivation” in these neighborhoods, namely: “crime, alcoholism, prostitution, delinquency, and rising suicide rates.” These problems would upset the mullahs, who believed this resulted from moral laxity. The disagreements the religious

establishment held against the regime centered around social and cultural issues. Regarding the shah's economic policies, the clerics opposed and denounced the social consequences of such policies and did not oppose them on economic grounds. Therefore, the clerical establishment held cultural and social differences with the regime but did not overturn the established economic environment. These socio-cultural differences present the primary disagreements between the religious establishment and the regime, forming a crux of the reasons for their participation in the revolution of 1979. The allies of the religious establishment, the traditional middle class in Iran, participated in the revolution alongside the religious establishment. The traditional middle class in Iran was made up predominantly of those working in the bazaars. The bazaars were made up primarily of 250,000 workers and controlled two-thirds of the country's retail trade (Abrahamian, 1980, 24). According to Abrahamian, the traditional middle classes of the bazaars held significant influence and spread their influence through those they employed and worked with. This ability to spread influence meant that the bazaars held influence both in the cities and in rural areas, expanding their area of influence. The bazaar class held economic differences from the shah, as his policy sought to reduce the influence of the traditional middle classes, specifically the bazaars. Finally, the rural migrant workers would form the base of the revolutionary manpower, particularly when millions would be seen marching in its final days in 1979. As previously mentioned, the economic policies implemented by the shah in what he deemed the 'White Revolution,' particularly land reform, had a significant impact on the workers in agricultural sectors. These workers would migrate to cities in search of employment. Mark Gasiorowski notes the large shift of workers from rural to urban spheres due to the land reform programs. Gasiorowski describes the living standards of the newly bolstered urban working class as being at the "subsistence" level in their shantytowns (Gasiorowski, 2019, 148). Gasiorowski continues to note that the new high levels of urban workers in cities contributed greatly to the political power of the urban working class. He observes that "The large size of the urban working class enabled it to engage extensively in collective political action and therefore made it potentially quite powerful.", drawing hundreds of thousands to protest the regime, as well as noting that the urban lower class played a "key role" in the 1979 revolution and the demonstrations that led up to it (Gasiorowski, 2019, 148). The size of the urban working class would make them an important ally for the revolutionary movement and would form a significant part of the protests that would draw millions to the streets. To return to Rudé's point,

the urban working classes likely did not participate in the protests to fulfill a desire of instigating anarchy. However, rather they must have held a rational reason for doing so. The list of reasons to be discontent for the urban working class further demonstrates that discontent was long. As previously mentioned, the urban working classes were subject to “subsistent” living standards. Therefore, it can be concluded that a likely reason the urban working classes participated in the demonstrations and consequently was discontent with their living standards in Pahlavi Iranian society. These living standards likely caused the urban working class to seek more economic opportunity, or at the least, to escape subsistence living. For the urban working class, we should look towards Rudé’s works and see the population of the urban working class as participating in the revolution to improve their economic opportunity. Their participation was primarily done in an attempt to escape subsistence living in many cases, or at the least to increase the equality of opportunity for economic progress.

These classes and their grievances with the regime would form the majority of those participating in the revolution. Subsequently, they would be present and influential in the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. While all classes participated in the revolution, the religious establishment based in Qom took the lead and was led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In the absence of an overarching ideological base for the revolution, the parts of the revolutionary movement were tied together by a common enemy in the Pahlavi regime. Furthermore, the parts of the revolutionary movement were seemingly driven not by ideology or by a desire to overturn the means of production or the economic structure of Iran. Instead, they sought to improve their conditions or exert social and cultural control over Iran’s social and political environments. The new political scene would be set with two figures, Khomeini leading the clerics and bridging their divide with the opposition parties, and Mehdi Bazargan, who led the opposition of the clerics, a coalition of liberals, moderates, and leftists, as the head of the provisional government. The provisional government’s main goals were to govern Iran during this transition period and oversee the process of drafting and approving a new constitution for the new government (Gasiorowski, 2014, 76). Finally, it is essential to note that the revolution did not seek to overthrow and replace the established political order in Iran entirely. Ayatollah Khomeini sought to operate in and expand the existing political framework in Iran. This idea is supported by Roger Owen, who described Khomeini’s leadership as being “aimed at seizing, and utilizing, the institutions of the Iranian state as they existed in the 1970s” (Owens, 2004, 83).

Owens continues to argue that the fast-paced nature demonstrates this effort to take over existing institutions that his supporters took over institutions such as the army and civil service institutions, purging their officers and officials and seizing power for themselves and Khomeini.

The fall of the shah would come in 1979 after a series of massive popular demonstrations. Scholar Randjbar-Daemi claims that “The arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini in France in late 1978 marked the beginning of the final phase of the Revolution and the erosion of any residual control of the monarchical authorities over Iran.” (Randjbar-Daemi, 2013, 643). Randjbar-Daemi continues, stating that from France, Khomeini was able to organize the opposition’s leadership and began debates over the institution and structure of the new republic. Randjbar-Daemi notes that another key leader of the opposition, Mehdi Bazargan, who led the Liberation Movement of Iran, suggested that if the shah were to give up power, the opposition should be ready to govern. Thus the new regime would need a constitution, to which Khomeini agreed. Jack Goldstone writes about the general course of revolutionary movements and governments and notes that there is generally a period of further polarization after the revolution’s regime change. The Islamic Revolution meant that the coalition that led the revolution would now find themselves at odds, giving a reasonably accurate image of what would follow for the new republic (Goldstone, 2009, 3).

Creating a constitution for the new government would be the first step the opposition would take towards creating the Islamic Republic. Creating the constitution would see different opposition elements to the shah competing for power and influence over the process. Initially, the competition between factions would begin with two previously mentioned figures. The Liberation Movement of Iran, Mehdi Bazargan, and Khomeini would compete for control over the process. Scholar Shaul Bakhash noted this split in the goals of those creating the new constitution. Bakhash notes that while most groups agreed on the need for a weakened presidency in fears of dictatorship, as well as a significant social security net, the crux of the disagreement between political groups centered on “political arrangements and the role of Islam in the new republic.” (Bakhash, 1985, 79-80) The balance of power seemed to skew in favor of Khomeini and the more religious establishment, using his “overarching influence at key moments in the evolution of the constitutional debates” in favor of his aims and advantages (Randjbar-Daemi, 2013, 644). Though the political coalition was not monolithically made up of

the conservative religious establishment, their power was considerable, and Khomeini's ability to tactically navigate the political grounds of the emerging political scene.

In Paris, Khomeini, believing he had the support of "a clear majority" of the Iranian population, would secretly form a body called the Revolutionary Council and would afford it many powers, notably the duty of approving members for the new Provisional Revolutionary Government (Randjbar-Daemi, 2013, 644). In addition to this, the Revolutionary Council was responsible for creating a Constituent Assembly for drafting and approving a new constitution. Khomeini's creation of the Revolutionary Council and its powers are representative of the influence that Khomeini held over the new government and Khomeini's vision for his place in this new government. Even in this early stage of the new regime, it seems that Khomeini was already angling to claim a prime position of power, as he already seemed to hold a majority of power within the provisional government. Furthermore, Randjbar-Daemi notes that the members of the Revolutionary Council were made up of clerical associates of Khomeini, as well as "lay Islamists who had contributed to the anti-shah struggle since the 1960s." (Randjbar-Daemi, 2013, 644-645). The fact that most members of the Revolutionary Council were made up of clerics symbolizes the role that Khomeini predicted clerics would play in the new government and the oversight powers Khomeini gave the council. In addition, this represented the initial political moves that Khomeini made to cement the clerics' power in the new government. Despite this political maneuvering, the creation of the constitution would go on. Khomeini would assign the initial drafting of the new constitution to a French sociologist within his inner circle, Hasan Habibi. This assignment would be a significant development, as Habibi would establish one of the critical institutions of the Islamic Republic, the presidency. According to Randjbar-Daemi, Habibi would create the constitution with the institutional configuration of the Fifth French Republic in mind, establishing three branches of government, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Randjbar-Daemi, 2013, 645). In his draft constitution, Habibi would place particular importance on the role of the presidency, affording the President a majority of a share of the power held in the proposed government, though eventually the powers in government would be "watered down" with some powers moving to the prime minister (Randjbar-Daemi, 2013, 645). Randjbar-Daemi argues that creating the role of the presidency was the most innovative part of the new constitution. Beyond this, Randjbar-Daemi identifies several articles in the constitution that would prove critical in shaping the new republic into an Islamic republic.

For example, article 15, which defines Shi'i Islam as the official state religion, and article 76 mandates that the President belongs to the Muslim faith and has Iranian origin and citizenship (Randjbar-Daemi, 2013, 654).

While it is certain that the presidency would play an essential role in the new government, when the first draft of the constitution was presented to Ayatollah Khomeini on the 26th of February 1979, it did not contain a mention of possibly the most crucial role in the Islamic Republic. The most important role would be *velayat-e faqih* (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), Iran's supreme leader (Randjbar-Daemi, 2017, 12). This lack of mention of the *velayat-e faqih* is interesting, as Iran's supreme leader holds near-total power in the Islamic regime. Its lack of mention represents the lack of direction that the revolution had in terms of a final goal and demonstrates that the original creators of the Islamic Republic's constitution had not intended for a position of supreme leader to exist. The concept of a 'Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist' would emerge during the latter part of the constitutional debate. The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist would prove to be the most powerful position in the new government. Rakel notes that the supreme leader was given immense powers—for example, the supreme leader's approval was required for all legislation—and that both the supreme leader and other newly established religious institutions would oversee the republican institutions (Rakel, 2009, 108). This debate would come about based on the division between two factions in the process of constitutional creation. Shaul Bakhash refers to two sides in this new division. The secularists who favored a non-religious government were leftists and liberals who wanted to create a secular state where the people's elected representatives would hold power. In contrast, the Islamists looked to create an Islamic state, in which "power would lie with Islamic jurists qualified to interpret the law." (Bakhash, 1985, 80). Khomeini would prove crucial to ensuring cohesion between the two ideologically opposed factions and subsequently shoring up his power and position. As Roger Owens argues that the separation of powers and parallel institutions made Khomeini's position integral to securing the cohesion of the provisional government and that, therefore, Khomeini was integral to the operation of the provisional government (Owen, 2004, 84)

This split between the secular democratic and the Islamist and more authoritarian factions would characterize the next decade of politics in Iran. The often secularist leftists and liberals would support the creation or maintenance of democratically elected representative institutions. In contrast, the conservative Islamists would support the creation of undemocratic institutions



that would exert their influence over the democratic ones and work to increase the share of power these institutions held in the republic. This power-sharing in the planning of the republic brings us back to the broad coalitions of the revolution and how they now made up the new revolutionary government. Ideologically, the government coalition was made up of both sides of the political spectrum, left and right. The right was made up of conservative Islamist establishments and organizations. The centrists were primarily made up of liberals. We can see the influence of the liberals in the early revolutionary movement when not only did students make up a large part of the demonstrations against the shah, but liberal ideas, such as freedom of speech and the creation of democracy, were supported by Khomeini and the broader revolutionary movement (Amanat, 2017, 703). Finally, the leftists would also maintain a presence in the early days of the republic. The influence of the leftists and left-leaning ideology was also present in the foundations of the new government. Furthermore, article 29 of the Iranian constitution claims that everyone may benefit from, among other things, unemployment benefits, disability pay, and social security (Iranian Const., 1979, art 29). Additionally, article 31 declares that “It is the right of every Iranian individual and family to possess housing commensurate with his needs” and that the Iranian government must make land available for this housing. While it is possible that these promises were to further the populist agenda of Khomeini, it is interesting that the promises and provisions included here are closely linked to traditionally Marxist and leftist ideas about the economy and what should be guaranteed and owed to the people. Furthermore, the constitution makes egalitarian and inclusive promises, for example, that the government has the right “to provide every citizen with the opportunity to work, and to create equal conditions for obtaining it.” (Iranian Const., 1979, art 28). The promises made in the constitution have substantial egalitarian leanings and the promises of equal opportunity for workers in the economy, which suggests that there was some Marxist influence over what would be included in the Iranian constitution.

As previously mentioned, the religious institution and Khomeini held the majority of the power in the new republic. They used this power to create two crucial institutions, the *velayat-e faqih* and the Guardianship Council. These institutions would be unelected and dominated if not fully controlled by the clerics and their allies. During these debates, other political groups associated with Khomeini would critique the secularist constitution in the form of creating their constitutions (Randjbar-Daemi, 2013, 655). These draft constitutions created by groups allied to

Khomeini called for the creation of the fourth branch of government, which they called the “Guardianship branch,” which would have the duty of direct supervision over the activities of parliament and the presidency, and essentially, over the democratic institutions of the Islamic Republic (Randjbar-Daemi, 2013, 655). The presence of these Islamic-inspired institutions is interesting when turning to the question of ideology in the Islamic Republic. While such ideas are not found in the dominant governing ideologies, such as democracy, authoritarianism, and communism, the basis of these ideas are found in Shi’i Islam and were consequently promoted by those who made up the religious establishment. Amanat Abbas describes the ideology of Khomeini and his supporters in the religious establishment as

“it was a strange mix of return to pristine Islam, the shari’a-laden worldview of Khomeini and his cohorts in Qom, notions of Islamic omdernity (as understood by tie-wearing Islamists such as Mehdi Bazargan), dormant Shi’i messianic aspirations, rampant anti-Westernism, and anti-Phlavi sentiment.” (Abbas, 2017, 703).

Furthermore, Abbas notes that there were genuine aspirations for “democracy, freedom of speech, and human rights” in the earlier stages of the movement, possibly due to the cooperation with leftist organizations. The ideology of Khomeini and the religious establishment was dominated by Islamic thinking and involved both new ideas and a return to the original ideology of Islam. From this ideology, the new, Islamic-inspired, and clerically dominated institutions would emerge and come to dominate the political sphere of the Islamic regime.

After the initial period of the provisional government and the constitution was passed by the Constituent Assembly, the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged. The decade after creating the Islamic Republic, the new government faced many crises and adversaries, both internal and external. Goldstone, as previously mentioned, describes revolutions as taking place over stages. He claims that radicals would take control after the revolution brings about regime change and an initial honeymoon period of cooperation with moderates. The revolution would enter a period of radical control and terror, “The victory of the radicals then leads to a “reign of terror” in which radical policies are forced through and implemented by coercion, moderates are purged from the government, and domestic enemies of the revolution are vigorously attacked.” (Goldstone, 2009,

8). The years that followed the revolution of 1979 would see the increasingly diminished power of moderates, secularists, and leftists and the growing power of radical Islamists who advocated for a traditional Islamic society and supported and expanded the undemocratic and non-elected institutions of Iran. The Islamist factions would essentially group and form the Islamic Republican Party, or IRP (Rakel, 2009, 115).

In the previous section, we discussed the power struggle between the secularists, who favored democratic and secular institutions, and conservative Islamists, who promoted the rule of the *velayat-e faqih*, the implementation of traditional Islamic values on Iranian society, and favored undemocratic institutions controlled by the clergy. This disagreement took place during the drafting of the new constitution. However, this power struggle did not stop with the approval of this constitution in 1979 but would continue until one faction gained near-total control. By the time the new constitution was approved, the share of power was already imbalanced in favor of the conservative forces led by Khomeini. The creation of clergy-controlled institutions demonstrates this majority share of power, of course, by establishing the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, both of which reflect the clergy's ability to establish and enshrine their role in the Islamic Republic nearly in perpetuity. This enshrining of clerical power, in effect, created an Islamic elite that would come to hold and exert the majority share of power in the Islamic Republic and thus skewing the new ruling political ideology to that of the conservative Islamic faction. The idea of a transition to an Islamic elite is supported by E.P. Rakel, who claims that, despite some continuity from the elite under the shah, the revolution brought about a new elite, composed of "clerics and religious laypersons" (Rakel, 2009, 108). Establishing such an elite means that a majority, if not an entire section of the ruling elite, would be composed of Islamists. Therefore, Islam would maintain a prominent role in the Islamic Republic. The first president of the Islamic Republic, Bani Sadr, would be an excellent example of the ideological split in the new Republic. Bani-Sadr was elected to the presidency in 1980 and was originally a follower of Khomeini. However, he defended the secularist institutions in the new republic and supported the democratic nature of those institutions (Cleveland, W. L., & Bunton, M., 2018, 365). Cleveland and Bunton describe Bani-Sadr's brief tenure as President as one characterized by Bani-Sadr's support for an Islamic identity in Iran but also by his favoring of secular government and opposition to the growing dominance of the religious establishment (Cleveland, W. L., & Bunton, M., 2018, 365). Bani-Sadr's presidency would not last long, with his decline being

assured by the absence of the classes that initially supported him, notably the professional middle classes who supported secularization. Cleveland and Bunton claim that this lack of support stemmed from the fact that the middle-class reformers who once expected to control the post-revolution government “were frightened into flight and silence,” subsequently isolating Bani-Sadr, and ultimately resulted in his impeachment in 1981, one year after his election (Cleveland, W. L., & Bunton, M., 2018, 365-366).

The impeachment of Bani-Sadr and the elimination of opposition to the IRP would mark a shift in the politics of the Islamic Republic. According to Maziar Behrooz, the IRP was instrumental in securing the power for Islamic institutions, or as Behrooz would describe it, “total political control.” (Behrooz, 1991, 600). Rakel describes this period as competition between two groups, the pragmatists who argued for reform in Iran’s domestic and foreign policy and the Islamic and lay intellectuals who advocated for eliminating the position of the Guardian of the Islamic Jurist. However, neither advocated separating religion and government instead of supporting the existing democratic system (Rakel, 2009, 116). The presence of socialist ideas in the faction that supported Khomeini further demonstrates that the varying ideologies of the revolution were able to survive through to the establishment of the republic and would themselves find a base of power to maintain their position in the republic. Opposed to the supporters of Khomeini was the republic’s equivalent to a radical far-right, composed of economic conservatives and cultural extremists (Wells, 1999, 30). This faction would support Khomeini’s policies but opposed the concept of a Guardian of Islamic Jurist. Behrooz would also note that the period after the dismissal of Bani-Sadr would be marked by a period of disagreement between two factions; however, Behrooz notes a different reason for being behind this disagreement. (Behrooz, 1991, 598). He claims that the division was based on disagreements over the economy. The disagreement revolved around whether the state should take a more prominent role in the economy and nationalize certain state institutions. This factionalism and continued disagreements would continue until the election of Rafsanjani to the presidency and the death of Khomeini, both taking place in 1989. These two events would redefine Iran’s political landscape and see the reemergence of moderate power and control in the Islamic Republic (Wells, 1999, 32).

The ideologies of the Iranian revolution, and the subsequent Islamic Republic, were varied, as the revolution was based on a broad coalition of ideologies united by a common enemy in the Pahlavi state. However, almost immediately, we would see a conflict between hardliner supporters of Khomeini and leftists and liberal organizations that would form Khomeini's opposition. This opposition would not last much longer than the constitutional debate and would largely fall apart with the impeachment of President Bani-Sadr. This dissolution of the opposition would lead to a further period of polarization between two Islamist factions within the IRP. While these periods saw the presence of differing ideologies, the one common ideological thread that can be identified in the revolution, initial regime change, and subsequent radical control would be Khomeini's brand of Islam. This ideology would essentially become the dominant ideology in the Islamic Republic for much of its naissance. While its original ideology might currently be diluted with new ideas and policies, Khomeini's ideology, or "Khomeinism," would leave its mark on the state institutions of the Islamic Republic, and therefore would leave a lasting ideological mark that would survive today.

## **Bibliography:**

Abrahamian, E. (1991). Khomeini: fundamentalist or populist?. *New Left Review*, 186(1), 102-19.

Abrahamian, E. (1980). Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution. *MERIP Reports*, 87, 21–26.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/3011417>

Abrahamian, E. (2009). The crowd in the Iranian Revolution. *Radical History Review*, 2009(105), 13-38.

Amanat, A. (2017). *Iran*. Yale University Press.

Bakhash, S. (1985). *The reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*. Tauris.

Behrooz, M. (1991). Factionalism in Iran under Khomeini. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 27(4), 597-614.

Cleveland, W. L., & Bunton, M. (2018). *A history of the modern Middle East*. Routledge.

*Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran* [], 24 October 1979, available at:  
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b56710.html> [accessed 8 November 2021]

Gasiorowski, M. (2019). US foreign policy and the shah. In *US Foreign Policy and the Shah*. Cornell University Press.

Gheissari, A. (2009). *Democracy in Iran: History and the quest for liberty*. Oxford University Press.

Goldstone, J. A. (2009). Rethinking revolutions: Integrating origins, processes, and outcomes. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 29(1), 18-32.

Green, J. D. (1984). Countermobilization as a Revolutionary Form. *Comparative Politics*, 16(2), 153–169. <https://doi.org/10.2307/421604>

Keddie, N. R. (1983). Iranian revolutions in comparative perspective. *The American Historical Review*, 88(3), 579-598.

Owen, R. (2004). *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East: Vol. 3rd ed.* Taylor & Francis Routledge

Rakel, E. P. (2009). The Political Elite in the Islamic Republic of Iran: From Khomeini to Ahmadinejad. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 29(1), 105-125.

Randjbar-Daemi, S. (2013). Building the Islamic state: the draft constitution of 1979 reconsidered. *Iranian Studies*, 46(4), 641-663.

Randjbar-Daemi, S. (2017). *The quest for authority in Iran: A history of the presidency from revolution to Rouhani.* Bloomsbury Publishing.

Rudé, G. F. (1981). *The crowd in history: A study of popular disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848.* Lawrence & Wishart Limited.

Wells, Matthew C. "Thermidor in the Islamic republic of Iran: the rise of Muhammad Khatami." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 1 (1999): 27-39.